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RAY V. ATLANTIC RICHFIELD:
A CASE FOR PREEMPTION
By Patricia J. Neel*
In the storm-tossed waters off Massachusetts last week, 7.6
million gal. of oil slid seaward. In the Delaware River, southwest
of Philadelphia, 134,000 more gal. of deadly goo spread toward
rich tidal marshes. In Los Angeles, the wreck of a blast-shattered
tanker still lay smoldering at its berth. Suddenly, on East Coast
and West, the U.S. was undergoing an ordeal by oil.'
Introduction
Transportation of oil by sea has increased enormously in the last
decade, 2 causing catastrophic and widespread problems such as the tanker
accidents described above. These problems may escalate in the future. In
order to supply its ever-growing demand for oil products, the United States
has turned increasingly to imports. 3 Since 1966, United States imports of oil
and petroleum products have nearly tripled;4 today approximately 300
million gallons a day arrive in United States ports.5 To move this vast
amount of oil economically, many large tankers have been constructed.
From 1966 to 1970 the world fleet of supertankers increased from less than 2
million deadweight tons (DWT) to over 50 million DWT.6 This dramatic
rise in the number of tankers transporting oil has resulted in expanded
problems of oil pollution, with consequent damage to the marine environ-
ment. 7 During the month of December,1976 alone, there were at least four
serious accidents causing extensive damage in United States waters.8 The
* Member, second-year class.
I. Oil is Pouring on Troubled Waters, TIME, Jan. 10, 1977, at 45 [hereinafter cited as
TIME]. This problem has received wide media attention in recent times. See, e.g., Blaze of
Anger Over Oil Spills, U.S. NEWS, Jan. 10, 1977, at 52; Worst Oil Spill? Tanker Argo Merchant,
NEWSWEEK, Jan. 10, 1977, at 74; Argo's Legacy, SCIENCE NEWS, Apr. 9, 1977, at 230; Oil In The
Ocean, SCIENCE, Dec. 16, 1977, at 1134.
2. S. REP. No. 95-176, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1977) [hereinafter cited as 1977 SENATE
REPORT].
3. TIME, supra note I, at 45.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. 1977 SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 3.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 5-7.
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SS Argo Merchant ran aground near Nantucket Island, dumping approxi-
mately 7 million gallons of oil into the ocean, the SS Sansinena exploded
while moored in Los Angeles Harbor, killing eight persons and spilling
approximately 20,000 gallons of oil into the harbor, the SS Olympic Games
ran aground, spreading 133,000 gallons of crude oil over a twenty-two mile
area of the Delaware River and the SS Oswega Peace struck a submerged
object, causing a fracture in the hull that leaked 5,000 gallons of fuel into
the Thames River at New London, Connecticut. 9 With the increasing use of
oil tankers and the concomitant likelihood of tanker mishaps, both the
federal government and the State of Washington have enacted legislation
regulating the operation and design of tankers. The extent to which these
two laws can coexist is the subject of this note.10
In 1972, Congress enacted the Ports and Waterways Safety Act
(PWSA)1I to promote safety and to protect the marine environment. Title 112
gave the United States Coast Guard power to establish and operate vessel
traffic control systems and to prescribe safety equipment and procedures.
Title ]113 authorized the Coast Guard to establish federal regulations for the
design, construction, maintenance and operation of tankers carrying oil or
other hazardous pollutants in bulk. Early in 1977, President Carter announc-
ed his intention to institute new regulatory measures for the purpose of
combating pollution from oil tankers. 14 The proposed amendments to the
PWSA15 establish a comprehensive program for the regulation of tanker
design and operation, promote continued efforts to establish international
standards for tanker regulations, 16 and set specific standards for tankers over
20,000 DWT in addition to those prescribed by the Coast Guard. 17 In 1975,
9. Id.
10. See generally Friendly, Federalism: A Foreword, 86 YALE L.J. 1019 (1977); Stewart,
Pyramids of Sacrifice?Problems of Federalism in Mandating State Implementation of National
Environmental Policy, 86 YALE L.J. 1196 (1977).
11. Ports and Waterways Safety Act of 1972, tit. I, §§ 101-107, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1221-1227
(Supp. V 1975) and tit. II, § 201, 46 U.S.C. § 391a (Supp. V 1975).
12. Tit. I, § 101, 33 U.S.C. § 1221 (Supp. V 1975). The Act actually provides that "the
Secretary of the department in which the Coast Guard is operating" will have these powers. Id.
This, in effect, has given the Coast Guard the powers enumerated in titles I and II of the Act.
13. Tit. II, § 201, 46 U.S.C. § 391a (Supp. V 1975).
14. 1977 SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 10.
15. Proposed Amendments to the Port and Waterways Safety Act, S. 682, 95th Cong., 1st
Sess., 123 CONG. REC. S8748 (daily ed. May 26, 1977) [hereinafter cited as Proposed
Amendments].
16. Id. § 303(a), at S8752. Section 303(a) of the Proposed Amendments provides that
"[t]he Secretary [of the department in which the Coast Guard operates] and the Secretary of
State shall undertake international negotiations, utilizing the appropriate international bodies or
forums, to achieve acceptance of regulations promulgated or required under this Act as
international standards." Id.
17. Proposed Amendments § 104(5), supra note 15, at S8751. Section 104(5) of the
Proposed Amendments is as follows:
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the State of Washington enacted its Tanker Law18 for the purpose of
decreasing the likelihood of oil spills on Puget Sound and its shorelines.
19
The state statute prohibits all tankers larger than 125,000 DWT from
entering Puget Sound.20 In addition, all oil tankers over 50,000 DWT are
required to take on pilots licensed by the State of Washington 21 and, if such
tankers lack the required safety and maneuvering capability, to employ a tug
escort while navigating Puget Sound and adjacent waters.22 This note
analyzes the constitutional validity of the Washington Tanker Law. It begins
with an examination of the district court opinion in Ray v. Atlantic Richfield
Co .23 The note then considers the effect of the Washington statute on the
free flow of interstate commerce in the context of a commerce clause
challenge. A detailed discussion then follows of the major issue of the case,
whether the federal PWSA preempts the Washington Tanker Law. The
preemption question is analyzed first by a review of the federal and state
legislation and the scope of the preemption doctrine in general. The section
concludes with an application of this doctrine to the facts of the Ray case. In
ascertaining whether the PWSA has preempted the Tanker Law, the note
(5) Minimum Standards.-In addition to any standards prescribed by the Secretary
pursuant to subsection (4) [of this section], or pursuant to any other law, any self-
propelled vessel in excess of 20,000 deadweight tons which carries, or is designed to
carry, oil in bulk, as cargo shall-
(A) not later than June 30, 1979, be equipped with-
(i) a dual radar system, one with short-range and one with long-
range capabilities and each with true-north features;
(ii) a collision avoidance system;
(iii) a long-range navigation aid;
(iv) adequate communications equipment;
(v) a fathometer;
(vi) a gyrocompass;
(vii) up-to-date charts; and
(B) not later than June 30, 1983, be equipped with-
(i) a segregated ballast system;
(ii) a transponder, or such other appropriate position-finding equip-
ment as the Secretary determines to be appropriate;
(iii) a gas inerting system; and
(iv) for any vessel the construction of which is contracted for, or
actually commenced, after January 1, 1980, a double bottom (fitted throughout the
cargo length of such vessel).
Id.
18. WASH. REv. CODE ANN. §§ 88.16.170-88.16-190 (Supp. 1976). For purposes of
convenience, these sections of the Washington Revised Code Annotated are referred to as the
Washington Tanker Law.
19. Id. § 88.16.170.
20. Id. § 88.16.190(l).
21. Id. § 88.16.180.
22. Id. § 88.16.190(2).
23. Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Evans, No. C 75-648 M (W.D. Wash., Sept. 24, 1976), prob.
juris. noted sub nom. Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 430 U.S. 905 (1977) (No. 76-930, 1977
Term).
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examines six major factors: the interest of the State of Washington in
protecting its natural resources, the pervasiveness of the federal scheme and
the presence of a dominant federal interest, the discretionary authority of the
federal regulatory agency, the Coast Guard, and finally, the possible effects
of inconsistent state regulations and the current need for national uniformity
in tanker regulation.
I. The District Court Opinion
On the day the Washington Tanker Law went into effect, Atlantic
Richfield Company filed suit to enjoin enforcement of the state statute.
Atlantic Richfield alleged that the Tanker Law was preempted by the
PWSA, placed an undue burden on interstate commerce and interfered with
the federal government in its conduct of foreign affairs.24 Because of the
substantial constitutional issues involved, a three-judge federal district court
was convened in the Western District of Washington. 5 In a terse and
perfunctory opinion, the district court held the Tanker Law null and void.
26
The three-judge federal district court found that the Tanker Law was
preempted by the PWSA, which established a "comprehensive federal
scheme for regulating the operations, traffic routes, pilotage, and safety
design specifications of tankers. "27 The court upheld Atlantic Richfield's
contention that the provision of the Tanker Law requiring a local pilot on all
tankers larger than 50,000 DWT had been preempted. 28 Because the Tanker
Law prohibited a tanker enrolled in the coastwide trade from navigating
Puget Sound without a local pilot, the court held that the statute was void
due to a conflict with clear federal law on the subject.2 9 The Tanker Law
provision prohibiting all vessels over 125,000 DWT from entering Puget
Sound was also found to have been preempted. The district court held that
the PWSA gives the Coast Guard the authority to create traffic control
systems for Puget Sound and that the Coast Guard had exercised that
authority. 30 In addition, under the PWSA the Coast Guard may restrict or
24. Brief for Appellees at 10-12, Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 430 U.S. 905 (1977) (No.
76-930, 1977 Term).
25. This three-judge federal district court was one of the last convened under the old
rules. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2281-84 (1970). On August 12, 1976, Congress enacted a law abolishing
three-judge district courts in most situations where the constitutionality of a state statute is
challenged, except for reapportionment and certain other types of cases. See Pub. L. No. 94-
381, §§ 1-3, 90 Stat. 1119.
26. Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Evans, No. C 75-648 M, slip op. at 6 (W.D. Wash., Sept. 24,
1976) prob. juris. noted sub nom. Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 430 U.S. 905 (1977) (No. 76-
930, 1977 Term).
27. Id., slip op. at 3.
28. Id., slip op. at 4.
29. Id. (citing 46 U.S.C. §§ 215, 364 (1970), which provides that vessels enrolled in the
coastwise trade, not sailing under register as a foreign vessel, shall, when under way, except on
the high seas, be under the control and direction of pilots licensed by the Coast Guard).
30. Id.
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exclude tankers from Puget Sound under hazardous conditions. 31 Finally, in
finding preemption of the safety design specifications of the Tanker Law for
vessels of 40,000 to 125,000 DWT, the court noted that the purpose of the
PWSA is "to establish a uniform set of regulations governing the types of
ships permitted within the coastal waters of the United States and the
conditions under which they would be permitted to operate.'"32 The court
also pointed out that Title II of the PWSA empowers the Coast Guard to
regulate design, construction and maintenance of tankers operating in
United States waters. 33 Washington's argument that the design specifica-
tions were not preempted because they could be avoided if the tanker had a
tug escort was rejected by the court. 34 The opinion stated that Congress gave
the Coast Guard the authority to require or not to require tug escorts in Puget
Sound, 35 and the tug escort proviso of the Tanker Law was therefore also
found to be preempted by the PWSA.36
The district court denied the motion by Washington state officials to
dismiss the complaint on the grounds of sovereign immunity under the
Eleventh Amendment. 37 The United States Supreme Court noted probable
jurisdiction38 and the case was heard before the highest court on October 31,
1977.
H. The Commerce Clause Issue
In the Ray case, Atlantic Richfield initially contended that the Wash-
ington Tanker Law violated the commerce clause of the United States
Constitution. 39 Although the district court based its decision on preemption
grounds, it is worthwhile to explore the commerce clause challenge.
31. Id. (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1221(3)(iv) (Supp. V 1975)).
32. Id., slip op. at 3.
33. Id. (citing 46 U.S.C. § 391a (Supp. V 1975)).
34. Id., slip op. at 3-4.
35. Id. (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1221(3)(iv) (Supp. V 1975)).
36. Id., slip op. at 4.
37. The State of Washington challenged the jurisdiction of the federal courts, asserting
sovereign immunity based on the Eleventh Amendment. Id., slip op. at 2. Under the Eleventh
Amendment and general policy surrounding it, a private person may not sue a state in a federal
court without the state's consent. This immunity, however, does not preclude a federal court
from taking jurisdiction of an action against a state officer to enjoin the enforcement of an
unconstitutional state statute. In such a situation, the state official is seen as acting without
lawful state authority since the state may not authorize violation of the United States Constitu-
tion and the action therefore is against the individual in a personal capacity. Ex Parte Young,
209 U.S. 123 (1908). In the present case, suit was brought against Evans, and then against Dixie
Lee Ray in their official capacity as governors of the State of Washington to enjoin enforce-
ment of a state statute that Atlantic Richfield contended was unconstitutional, thus placing the
case within the Young holding. Young has never been overruled and a discussion as to whether
the time is ripe for such overruling is beyond the scope of this note.
38. 430 U.S. 905 (1977).
39. Brief for Appellees at 57.
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A. Commerce Clause Law
"The poor condition of American commerce and the proliferating trade
rivalries between the states were the immediate provocations for the calling
of the Constitutional Convention.' "' In response to the concerns of the
framers of the Constitution, Congress was granted the power "[t]o regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several states ... "41
This grant of national authority to Congress, which was designed to prevent
Balkanization of the economy, has been the subject of extensive con-
sideration by the courts. 42 Justice John Marshall's landmark opinion in
Gibbons v. Ogden43 defined commerce as "the power to regulate; that is, to
prescribe the rule by which commerce is to be governed."I The Court also
recognized the scope of congressional power: "If, as has always been
understood, the sovereignty of Congress, though limited to specified ob-
jects, is plenary as to those objects, the power over commerce with foreign
nations, and among the several States, is vested in Congress as absolutely as
it would be in a single government . . ."45 In Gibbons, Chief Justice
Marshall established a very broad definition of commerce, one that encom-
passed "every species of commercial intercourse,' ' and held that
Congress' power was not limited to the interchange of goods across state
lines but included navigation of waterways as well. 47 Although Chief Justice
Marshall recognized that the states have some concurrent powers with the
federal government in the area of commerce, 48 the state steamboat monopo-
ly statute challenged in Gibbons was held unconstitutional under the supre-
macy clause. 49 The state law was held to conflict with a coastal trading
license held by Gibbons under a valid federal statute.
50
The issue of whether the commerce power was vested exclusively in
Congress was not resolved until 1851 in the case of Cooley v. Board of
Wardens. 51 The issue facing the Cooley Court was whether a state had the
power to regulate the use of habor pilots by requiring arriving and departing
ships to accept local pilots while in harbor waters. 52 The state statute was
clearly a regulation of commerce. In upholding the law, the Court
found that congressional power to regulate commerce was not exclusive in
40. G. GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 127 (9th ed. 1975).
41. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3.
42. G. GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 127 (9th ed. 1975).
43. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
44. Id. at 196.
45. Id. at 197.
46. Id. at 193.
47. Id. at 190.
48. Id. at 210.
49. Id. at 240.
50. Id. at 239-40.
51. 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851).
52. Id. at 320.
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all cases. 53 The question as to whether the commerce clause required
exclusive federal regulation depended upon the nature of the activity being
regulated. If the activity required uniform national regulation, the power
was vested exclusively in Congress. If diverse local circumstances demand-
ed differing local regulations, the commerce power was shared concurrently
with the states.
54
The twentieth century has witnessed a great expansion in the scope of
authority derived from the commerce clause. 55 The Supreme Court has held
that the power of Congress to regulate commerce includes the power to
regulate such local activities as agriculture, manufacturing, and mining.
56
The commerce clause has also been found to be a sufficient basis for
upholding the Civil Rights Act of 1964.57 While the Supreme Court has
recognized that both the federal and state governments have legitimate
concerns in the regulation of commerce, the precise parameters of their roles
have not been defined. State power is limited, at least by implication, by the
fact that the Constitution vests the power to regulate commerce in Congress
so as to promote national uniformity. In assessing the state's role in the
regulation of commerce, therefore, the courts have distinguished between
the legitimate exercise of the state's police power to protect the health,
safety, and welfare of its citizens, and an exercise of state power that would
restrict or burden the flow of interstate commerce, often for local economic
advantage. The Court has recognized that such a judicial inquiry may
amount to a balancing of policy considerations. In California v. Zook,58 for
example, the Court stated that "the question is whether the state interest is
outweighed by a national interest in the unhampered operation of interstate
commerce." 59 Chief Justice Stone in Southern Pacific v. Arizona6° also
53. Id. at 318-19.
54. Id. at 319.
55. See generally Campbell, Chancellor Kent, Chief Justice Marshall and the Steamboat
Cases, 25 SYRACUSE L. REV. 497 (1974); Tarlock, Oil Pollution on Lake Superior: The Uses of
State Regulation, 61 MINN. L. REV. 63 (1976); Note, Environmental Law-Commerce Clause:
Congress May Prohibit the Discharge of Oil Into Nonnavigable Tributary of Navigable Water
Absent Showing That Oil Reached and Polluted Navigable Water, 27 ALA. L. REV. 227 (1975);
Note, State Environmental Protection Legislation and The Commerce Clause, 87 HARV. L.
REV. 1762 (1974); Note, Constitutional Law-Commerce Clause: Local Discrimination in
Environmental Protection Regulation, 55 N.C. L. REv. 461 (1977); Note, Alaska's Regulation
of King Crab on the Outer Continental Shelf, 6 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 357 (1977); Note, Waters of
the United States: Does Federal Control Inundate the Wetland?, 26 U. FLA. L. REV. 893 (1974).
56. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952); Wickard v. Filburn,
317 U.S. 111 (1942); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin
Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
57. Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United
States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
58. 336 U.S. 725 (1949).
59. Id. at 728.
60. 325 U.S. 761 (1945).
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concluded that there must be "appraisal and accommodation of the compet-
ing demands of the state and national interests involved."
'61
In Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co.,62 a major oil company contended that
the Washington Tanker Law violated the commerce clause because it would
substantially impede the efficient flow of commerce in an area demanding
uniform regulation. 63 Since the time of Cooley, the Court has recognized
that the states have a concurrent, but limited, power to regulate commerce. In
an attempt to balance the national interest in the freedom of interstate
commerce with the state interest in matters of local concern, the Court has
considered whether the state regulations discriminate against interstate
commerce, 64 whether the state regulation places an unreasonable burden on
interstate commerce, 65 and a closely related issue, whether the area of
commerce being regulated demands national uniformity. 6
The concepts of national uniformity and unreasonable burdens on
interstate commerce were first recognized by the Supreme Court in Southern
Pacific Co. v. Arizona.67 Southern Pacific challenged the Arizona Train
Limit Law, which prohibited the operation within the state of railroad trains
having more than fourteen passenger or seventy freight cars. 68 The Court
found that enforcement of the state law in Arizona, while train lengths were
unregulated or regulated by varying standards in other states, would result in
impairment of uniform and efficient operation of the railroads and would
substantially increase operating costs. 69 The law was therefore held invalid
as contravening the commerce clause. The Court recognized that, while
states were allowed a great deal of latitude in the regulation of local matters
that may in some way affect commerce, they could not materially restrict the
free flow of commerce and thereby interfere with matters demanding nation-
al uniformity.7' The decisive question for the Court was whether the total
effect of the state safety regulation in reducing accidents was so slight as not
to outweigh the national interest in keeping interstate commerce unimpeded
and under uniform national regulation. 71 The Court concluded that examina-
61. Id. at 769.
62. 430 U.S. 905 (1977) (No. 76-930, 1977 Term), noting prob. juris., Atantic Richfield
Co. v. Evans, No. C 75-648 M (W.D. Wash., Sept. 25, 1976).
63. Brief for Appellees at 57.
64. See, e.g., Polar Ice Cream & Creamery Co. v. Andrews, 375 U.S. 361 (1964); Dean
Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951); Minnesota v. Barber, 136 U.S. 313 (1890).
65. See, e.g., Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520 (1959); H. P. Hood & Sons
v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525 (1949); Baldwin v. G. A. F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511 (1935).
66. Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945).
67. Id.
68. Id. at 763.
69. Id. at 773.
70. Id. at 770. See generally Note, Federal Regulation Under Federal Aviation Act and
Noise Control Act Preempts the Field of Airport and Aircraft Noise Control Rendering Local
Airport Curfews Invalid, 22 U. KAN. L. REV. 319 (1974) [hereinafter cited as FederalAviation
Noise Control].
71. 325 U.S. at 775-76.
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tion of the facts revealed slight, if any, safety advantages in regulated as
opposed to unregulated train lengths.72 The state interest was therefore
outweighed by a national interest in a railway system regulated by one body
with nationwide authority.
73
In Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc. ,74 the Court again considered the
effect of a state regulation on the flow of interstate commerce. The issue in
Bibb was whether the commerce clause was violated by a state statute
requiring the use of curved rear fender mudguards on trucks operating on
Illinois highways. Unlike Illinois, forty-five other states permitted the use of
straight mudguards. The Court balanced the state and federal interests
involved and held that, although the states have great latitude in the promul-
gation of safety regulations, the unreasonable burden that the state placed on
interstate commerce exceeded the permissible limits. 75 The Illinois statute
significantly burdened interstate truck transportation and there was insuffi-
cient evidence as to health or safety advantages in the state regulation.
76
More recently the Court in Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc. 77 struck down
an Arizona regulation barring the shipment of local cantaloupes out of state
unless the cantaloupes were crated in Arizona so as to reflect their initial
origin. 78 The Court held this regulation was an undue burden on commerce
since it would require a grower with adequate packing facilities in California
to invest $200,000 for an unneeded Arizona packing shed to pack his annual
$700,000 Arizona crop.7 9 In the majority opinion, Justice Stewart stated that
the extent of the burden that will be tolerated depends on the local interest
involved and whether it can be achieved as well with a lesser impact on
interstate activities. 80 The Court in Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v.
Cottrell81 upheld the balancing standard set out in Pike as proper and
unanimously invalidated a Mississippi statute which provided that milk from
another state could be sold in Mississippi only if the other state accepted
72. Id. at 779.
73. Id. at 781-82.
74. 359 U.S. 520 (1959).
75. Id. at 530.
76. Id. at 524. In an earlier case involving state regulation of the size and weight of trucks
using the state highways, the Court in South Carolina State Highway Dep't v. Barnwell Bros.,
Inc., 303 U.S. 177 (1938), reached a contrary result, upholding the state regulation as a valid
safety measure. The state statute limited the use of South Carolina highways to vehicles less
than 90 inches wide and having a gross loaded weight of less than 20,000 pounds. While the
facts in Barnwell showed that the regulation in effect excluded 85-90% of the trucks engaged in
interstate commerce from using the South Carolina highways, the Court in considering the
special conditions involved found the weight and width regulations were justified. Id. at 195-96.
77. 397 U.S. 137 (1970).
78. Id. at 146.
79. rd. at 145.
80. Id. at 142.
81. 424 U.S. 366 (1976).
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Mississippi milk on a reciprocal basis. 82 In reversing the lower court, Justice
Brennan stated: "The fallacy in the District Court's reasoning is that it
attached insufficient significance to the interference . . . upon the national
interest in freedom for the national commerce, and attached too great
significance to the state interests purported to be served . "...83
While the Court has continued to invalidate state laws that burden
interstate commerce, it also has upheld state regulations that are legitimate
matters of local concern and that do not substantially impede free economic
competition across state lines. 84 The Court is, in effect, weighing the
national interest in uniformity of interstate commerce regulation against the
state interest in protecting the health and safety of its citizens.
B. The Commerce Clause Issue in Ray
In the Ray case, the State of Washington's declared interest in the
protection of local natural resources must be balanced against the federal
interest in the uniform regulation of the free flow of commerce. The federal
government has a very real concern in maintaining open and unimpeded
channels for the flow of oil to and among United States ports. The American
economy is dependent on adequate oil supplies to meet increasing fuel
manufacturing and energy needs. 85 Forcing oil tankers to cope with different
size prohibitions and design requirements in each port or harbor would
substantially impair the efficient movement of commerce. The state, on the
other hand, may argue that the regulation of tanker traffic does not require
national uniformity, that tug escort and access limits are the types of
limitations that must be tailored to diverse local conditions. However, as in
Southern Pacific and Bibb, the State of Washington did not convince the
district court that its design and navigation requirements are superior to
those of the PWSA in preventing accidents or in protecting the marine and
natural environment. Further, the danger inherent in ships over 125,000
DWT, the Washington size limitation, has not been proven to be demonstr-
ably greater than that found in the increased number of smaller vessels that
would be required to carry the same amount of oil. Since it has not been
shown that enforcement of the Tanker Law, in addition to the PWSA, would
serve an important health or safety function for the State of Washington, the
national interest in the free and efficient flow of interstate commerce should
require that the burdensome effects of enforcement of the Washington
statute be prohibited.
With receipt of foreign and Alaskan oil steadily increasing in response
to increased energy needs, the efficient movement of oil tankers becomes
82. Id. at 375-76.
83. Id. at 375.
84. See, e.g., Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132 (1963); Huron
Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440 (1960).
85. 1977 SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 9.
[Vol. 5
CASE FOR PREEMPTION
more important. Thus, the case for uniform federal regulations to avoid
inconsistent state laws becomes more compelling. Should it decide to base
its decision in Ray on commerce clause grounds, the Court must determine
whether national uniformity in regulation of tanker design and operation is
necessary to avoid the burdensome inconsistency of state laws or whether
requirements such as tug escorts and access limits are amenable to local
regulation designed to meet local needs and conditions. On the basis of its
prior holdings in Southern Pacific, Bibb, Pike, and Cottrell, the Court
would most likely find that the national interest in uniform tanker regula-
tions outweighs the state interest in local controls.
III. The Preemption Issue
In deciding the preemption issue in Ray, the Court will first examine
the federal statute and its legislative history to ascertain the scope and detail
of the PWSA and the intent of Congress in enacting that law. The Court will
then consider the provisions and effect of the Washington Tanker Law to
determine if the state law has been preempted.
A. The Federal and State Legislation
1. The Ports and Waterways Safety Act
Enactment of the Ports and Waterways Safety Act of 197286 was aimed
at protecting the marine environment by establishing a comprehensive
scheme of federal regulations for the design and operation of tankers. 87 The
two titles contained in the PWSA, Title I dealing with the establishment of
regulations for vessel traffic controls88 and Title H containing design and
construction requirements for tankers, 89 represent a "systems approach," 90
focusing on the prevention of oil pollution.91 The PWSA provides the Coast
Guard with broad authority to establish and operate vessel traffic systems for
congested waters and to prescribe design and safety equipment standards for
vessels subject to the Act.
92
86. Tit. I, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1221-1227 and tit. II, 46 U.S.C. § 391a (Supp. V 1975).
87. S. REP. No. 92-724, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1972) [hereinafter cited as 1972 SENATE
REPORT].
88. Tit. I, § 101, 33 U.S.C. § 1221 (Supp. V 1975).
89. Tit. II, § 201, 46 U.S.C. § 391a (Supp. V 1975).
90. Although concurring in the need for vessel traffic services, systems and con-
trols as contained in H.R. 8140, the committee believed that a comprehensive ap-
proach to the prevention of pollution from marine operations and casualties re-
quired, in addition, improvement of the vessels themselves: their design, construction,
maintenance, and operation. . . .It is clear that a systems approach to prevention of
damage to the marine environment requires not only better control of vessel traffic but
an improvement in the vessels themselves.
1972 SENATE REPORT, supra note 87, at 13.
91. Id. at 13.
92. Id. at 7.
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Specifically, Title I of the PWSA grants to the Coast Guard the power
to:
1) establish and operate vessel traffic systems (VTS) for waters
subject to vessel traffic; 93
2) require compliance with a VTS, including the carrying of any
electronic devices necessary to the systems;
94
3) control vessel traffic in hazardous areas by
i) specifying times of movements through ports or other waters;
ii) establishing vessel traffic routing schemes;
iii) establishing vessel size and speed limitations and vessel
operating conditions; and
iv) restricting vessel operation under hazardous conditions;
95
4) direct the anchoring, mooring, or movement of vessels when
necessary to prevent damage; and
96
5) require pilots on vessels engaged in the foreign trade under cir-
cumstances where a pilot is not required by state law.
97
The Act provides that the Coast Guard, in carrying out its authority, shall
consult with other federal agencies and consider regulations issued by port
or other state and local authorities.
98
In exercising its authority under the PWSA, the Coast Guard must
consider and balance a number of factors. 99 These factors include the scope
and degree of the hazard involved, vessel traffic characteristics, port and
waterway configurations, the differences in geographic, climatic, and other
conditions and circumstances, environmental factors, economic impact and
effects, existing vessel traffic control systems, and local practices and
customs. 100 Title II of the Act provides that the Coast Guard "shall establish
. . . such additional rules and regulations as may be necessary with respect
to the design and construction, alteration, repair, and maintenance of...
vessels." 10 1 In carrying out its duties under Title II, the Coast Guard is
required to consider the need for such regulations, the extent to which they
will contribute to safety and the protection of the marine environment, and
the practicability of compliance therewith, including cost and technical
feasibility. l ' 2
93. Tit. I, § 101, 33 U.S.C. § 1221(1) (Supp. V 1975).
94. Id. § 1221(2).
95. Id. § 1221(3).
96. Id. § 1221(4).
97. Id. § 1221(5).
98. Tit. I, § 102, 33 U.S.C. § 1222(c) (Supp. V 1975).
99. Id. § 1222(e).
100. Id.
101. Tit. II, § 201, 46 U.S.C. § 391a(3) (Supp. V 1975).
102. Id. § 391a(4).
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In March of 1977, President Carter announced his intention to establish
new regulatory measures to address the growing problem of oil pollution
from tankers.10 3 The proposed Amendments to the PWSA reflect the belief
of the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation that
improvements in legislation were necessary if only to clarify Congressional
policy and purposes.'14 Congress' intent to establish a comprehensive feder-
al scheme for regulation of design, equipment and operation of tankers, and
to encourage continued efforts to obtain international agreements concern-
ing navigation and protection of the environment is reflected in the proposed
amendments.10 5 This intent to establish comprehensive regulations was also
mentioned in the enactment of the PWSA in 1972: "Comprehensive legisla-
tion is needed to protect our coastal waters and resources including fish,
shellfish, wildlife, marine and coastal ecosystems and recreational and
scenic values. What is most urgently needed is legislation that will put the
emphasis on prevention, and that is the thrust of [the PWSA] as
amended." 106 The proposed amendments restate those provisions from the
1972 Act covering the powers and duties of the Coast Guard 07 and the
factors that it must consider in the exercise of its authority.108 They also
reiterate that the Coast Guard shall establish procedures for consulting with
state and local governments that are experienced in dealing with local traffic
control problems. 109 But the proposed amendments also require any vessel
over 20,000 DWT that carries, or is designed to carry, oil in bulk to meet
103. 1977 SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 10.
104. Id.
105. Proposed Amendments §§ 102(b)-102(c), supra note 15, at S8748-49. Sections 102(b)-
102(c) of the Proposed Amendments are as follows:
(b) Purposes-It is therefore the purposes of Congress in this Act-
(1) to authorize a comprehensive inspection and enforcement program for in-
creased navigation and vessel safety and enhanced protection of the marine environ-
ment;
(2) to direct the Federal Government to establish stringent standards for the
design, construction, equipment, maintenance, alteration, repair, operation, and man-
ning of all vessels which (A) use any port of the United States or (B) operate in the
navigable waters of the United States; and
(3) to establish a program to prevent any substandard vessel from (A) using any
port of the United States or (B) operating in the navigable waters of the United States.
(c) Policy-It is further declared to be the policy of the Congress in this Act-
(i) to authorize no impediment to, or interference with, the right of innocent
passage or any recognized legitimate use of the high seas; and
(2) to support and encourage continued active United States efforts to obtain
international agreements concerning navigation and vessel safety and protection of the
marine environment.
106. 1972 SENATE REPORT, supra note 87, at 9 (emphasis in original).
107. Proposed Amendments § 101, supra note 15, at S8749.
108. Proposed Amendments § 103, supra note 15, at S8749.
109. Id.
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specific standards in addition to those promulgated by the Coast Guard. 110
These standards include: (1) segregated ballast systems to insure that the
seawater taken on by empty tankers for ballast and discharged upon entering
a loading port does not become polluted by being stored in the oil tanks; (2)
double bottoms to prevent most oil spillage that results from limited intensi-
ty hull ruptures due to groundings such as those that have occurred within
harbors and near shore areas; (3) and dual radar systems with collision
avoidance capabilities. 11 Another effect of the proposed amendments
would be a substantial expansion of the authority of the Coast Guard in the
area of international negotiations. One of the important provisions that
would be added to the PWSA provides that "[t]he Secretary [of the Depart-
ment in which the Coast Guard operates] and the Secretary of State shall
undertake international negotiations, utilizing the appropriate international
bodies or forums, to achieve acceptance of regulations promulgated or
required' under this Act as international standards ' 112 Thus, the PWSA and
proposed amendments arguably establish a comprehensive scheme of feder-
al regulation of the design and operation of oil tankers. This regulatory
program gives the Coast Guard broad power to establish and operate vessel
traffic systems and requires certain design standards in addition to those
promulgated by the Coast Guard. In addition, the strong federal interest in
international affairs is reflected in the proposed amendments that will grant
authority to the Coast Guard to enter into international negotiations for the
purpose of achieving acceptance of the federal regulations as international
standards.
2. The Washington Tanker Law
As a result of a fear of oil spills by tankers in Puget Sound, the
Washington Tanker Law was enacted. 113 The Washington Legislature incor-
porated its concerns for the environment and the citizenry in the statute. The
legislators cited the "great potential hazard" to the state's natural resources
and the jobs dependent on those resources.' 14 The legislature also recog-
nized Puget Sound as a relatively confined environment with irregular
shorelines that was, as a result, more susceptible to long-term damage from
oil spills. 115 Due to the limited space for maneuvering large tankers and the
many natural navigational obstacles in Puget Sound, the legislature found
that it was important that oil tankers be piloted by skilled persons familiar
110. Proposed Amendments § 104, supra note 15, at S8750.
111. 1977 SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 12-16.
112. Proposed Amendments § 303, supra note 15, at S8752.
113. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 88.16.170-88.16.190 (Supp. 1976).
114. Id. § 88.16.170.
115. Id.
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with local waters and that such tankers be capable of rapid maneuvering
responses. 116 The Tanker Law, the specific intent and purpose of which is
"to decrease the likelihood of oil spills on Puget Sound, and its
shorelines,"117 contains three operative provisions: 1) the size limit pro-
hibits any oil tanker over 125,000 DWT from entering Puget Sound;
118
2) the design requirements and tug escort proviso prohibits any oil tanker
between 40,000 and 125,000 DWT from entering Puget Sound unless it has
minimum shaft horsepower of one horsepower for each two and one-half
DWT, twin screws, double bottoms underneath all cargo compartments,
two radar systems, one of which must be collision-avoidance radar, and
such other navigational systems as may be prescribed by the State Board of
Pilotage Commission; however, tankers not meeting the foregoing design
requirements may still enter Puget Sound if escorted by tugboats with an
aggregate horsepower of five per cent of the tanker's DWT; 119 and 3) the
pilotage requirement provides that any oil tanker of 50,000 DWT or greater
must employ a pilot licensed by the State of Washington while navigating
Puget Sound. 120
B. Parameters of the Preemption Doctrine
In the Ray case, Atlantic Richfield also challenged the Washington
Tanker Law on grounds that the state statute was preempted by the federal
PWSA. Traditional case law has recognized that when there is congressional
silence 21 as to a subject being regulated, there may be implied permission
for the states to regulate.122 However, if Congress adopts federal legislation,
then under the supremacy clause of the Constitution, the federal statute may
supersede state regulation and preempt any further state control. The sole
ground on which the three-judge federal district court in Ray rested its
decision was that the PWSA preempted the Washington Tanker Law.123 In
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. § 88.16.190(l).
119. Id. § 88.16.190(2).
120. Id. § 88.16.180.
121. The "silence of Congress" doctrine is traceable to the Court's discussion of the
concurrent federal-state regulation problem in Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.)
299 (1851). The Court in Cooley, in discussing the act of 1789, stated that "the nature of this
subject is such that until Congress should find it necessary to exert its power, [the regulation]
should be left to the legislation of the States." Id. at 319.
122. In South Carolina State Highway Dep't v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177 (1938), the
Court acknowledged that a state may build and maintain its highways and that, in the absence of
congressional action, regulation is within the state's competence even though interstate
commerce is materially affected. Id. at 187.
123. Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Evans, No. C 75-648 M, slip op. at 6 (W.D. Wash., Sept. 24,
1976) prob. juds. noted sub nom. Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 430 U.S. 905 (1977) (No. 76-
930, 1977 Term).
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so ruling, the court reflected a judicial trend toward reliance on the preemp-
tion doctrine without reaching the commerce clause issue. 1
24
The preemption doctrine is based on the supremacy clause of the
Constitution, which states that the Constitution and the laws of the United
States made pursuant thereto are the supreme law of the land and that the
states are bound by them. 125 Thus, a state statute that is enacted within the
purview of state power and that is not in conflict with any constitutional
prohibition may nevertheless be unenforceable if federal legislation has
preempted state statutes. The preemption doctrine has been used by courts
to invalidate state laws that are in direct conflict with a federal act 26 or that
Congress has precluded explicitly or implicitly by enacting federal regula-
tions with an intent to occupy the field. 127 With the enactment by Congress
of regulations in an ever-increasing number of fields, the courts have been
charged more frequently with the task of ascertaining the purpose and scope
of federal acts.
Despite increasing reliance on preemption as a decisional ground, there
has been relatively little agreement as to the appropriate standard for analy-
sis. 128 This inconsistent application has been viewed by many critics as the
most troublesome aspect of the doctrine. 129 As Justice Black indicated in
Hines v. Davidowitz,130 "none of [the Court's] expressions provides an
infallible constitutional test or an exclusive constitutional yardstick. In the
final analysis, there can be no one crystal clear distinctly marked formu-
la." 131 One rather acid comment on the Supreme Court's failure to develop
a uniform approach to preemption is that its decisions take on an "unprin-
cipled quality, seemingly bereft of any consistent doctrinal basis." 1
32
Some factors that the Court has considered as important in finding
preemption are the presence or absence of direct conflict between state and
124. See, e.g., Douglas v. Seacoast Prods., Inc., 431 U.S. 265 (1977); Jones v. Rath Packing
Co., 430 U.S. 519 (1977); City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624 (1973);
Northern States Power Co. v. Minnesota, 447 F.2d 1143 (8th Cir. 1971). aff'd mem., 405 U.S.
1035 (1972).
125. U.S. CONST. art. VI., cl. 2.
126. See, e.g., Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637 (1971).
127. See, e.g., Douglas v. Seacoast Prods., Inc., 431 U.S. 265 (1977); Jones v. Rath Packing
Co., 430 U.S. 519 (1977); City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc 411 U.S. 624 (1973);
Campbell v. Hussey, 368 U.S. 297 (1961); Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218 (1947);
Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941).
128. See Note, Federal Preemption of State Laws, 50 IND. L.J. 848 (1975).
129. See Catz & Lenard, The Demise of the Implied Federal Preemption Doctrine, 4
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 295 (1977).
130. 312 U.S. 52 (1941).
131. Id. at 67.
132. Note, The Preemption Doctrine: Shifting Perspectives on Federalism and The Burger
Court, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 623, 624 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Preemption Doctrine].
[Vol. 5
federal regulation, 133 explicit congressional intent to occupy the field,
134
administrative incompatibility, 135 dominant federal interest 136 and local
police power concerns. 137 In the absence of a consistent approach by the
Court, it has been suggested that a case-by-case approach be openly adopt-
ed. 138 Under this approach, the factors cited above would be used to balance
the federal and state interests in a manner reminiscent of commerce clause
cases.
1 39
The most obvious situation in which the issue of preemption arises is
the case of a direct conflict between federal and state legislation. One of the
rare cases of actual conflict between federal and state action occurred in
Perez v. Campbell. 140 The Arizona Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act
provided for suspension of driver's licenses as a sanction for non-payment
of automobile accident judgments, and applied to debtors who had received
a discharge in bankruptcy.' 41 The latter provision was held to be in direct
conflict with the Federal Bankruptcy Act, which states that a discharge in
bankruptcy fully discharges all but certain specified judgments. Here the
fact that the state statute was concerned with highway safety, while the
Bankruptcy Act was concerned with debtor rehabilitation was held to be an
insufficient basis for finding no conflict. The state act was therefore held
unconstitutional as violative of the supremacy clause. 1
42
The effect of a direct conflict was also discussed by Justice Stewart in
Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit.143 The majority in Huron
upheld a Detroit smoke abatement ordinance as applied to ships using
boilers that had been inspected and licensed by the federal government. The
Court found no conflict between the municipal ordinance and federal boiler
133. Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637 (1971); Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of
Detroit, 362 U.S. 440 (1960).
134. Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132 (1963); Campbell v.
Hussey, 368 U.S. 297 (1961).
135. City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624 (1973).
136. Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497 (1955); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941).
137. Kelly v. Washington ex rel. Foss Co., 302 U.S. 1 (1937).
138. Preemption Doctrine, supra note 132, at 654.
139. It has been argued that the courts are using essentially the same reasoning process in a
case based on preemption as had been used in past cases in which the issue was whether the
state regulation unduly burdened interstate commerce. Note, Preemption as a Preferential
Ground, 12 STAN. L. REV. 208, 219-20 (1959). Even with the rash of current criticism of the
doctrine, reliance on preemption has escalated, shifting to Congress the responsibility for
invalidating the state law in question. This shift results because the Court, in deciding a case on
the basis of the preemption doctrine is, in effect, attempting to determine congressional intent
in enacting the legislation and the extent of permissible state legislation in the same field. Id. at
224. One commentator has postulated that, by using the preemption doctrine, flexibility is
gained because the decision invites congressional reconsideration and thus allows Congress a
greater share in the process. Id. at 225.
140. 402 U.S. 637 (1971).
141. Id. at 641-42.
142. Id. at 656.
143. 362 U.S. 440 (1960).
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inspection provisions because the main purpose of federal inspection was to
insure safety while the Detroit ordinance was directed solely at air poilu-
tion. 144 Justice Stewart's opinion stated that intent to supersede the state's
exercise of its police power in areas not covered by federal legislation is not
to be inferred from the fact that Congress has occupied a limited field. 145 In
other words, such intent is not to be inferred unless the act of Congress is in
actual conflict with the law of the state. 146
Even where there is no direct conflict between the federal and state
laws, the Court may find preemption where Congress has indicated an intent
to exclude supplementary state legislation. The Court found this element
present in one of the first major preemption cases, Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator
Corp. 4 7 Rice dealt with the effect of the 1931 amendments to the United
States Warehouse Act. By these amendments, Congress terminated the dual
system of state and federal regulation provided by the original act and
substituted an exclusive system of federal regulation of federally licensed
warehouses. 148 The Court therefore held that warehouses licensed under the
federal act were not required to comply with state laws covering the same
phases of warehouse business. 149 In attempting to establish a preemption
standard, the Court in Rice held that, in areas in which the states have
traditionally been allowed to exercise their police power in enacting regula-
tions for the protection of the health, safety and welfare of the community,
state action is not superseded by the federal act unless that is the "clear and
manifest purpose of Congress."'150 Justice Douglas found that such a pur-
pose may be shown in several ways. The scheme of federal regulation may
be so pervasive as to reasonably imply that no room was left by Congress for
the states to supplement; 151 the act of Congress may regulate a field in
which the federal interest is dominant; 5 2 or finally, the state policy may
produce a result inconsistent with the objectives of the federal scheme.
15
The Rice analysis subsequently was used in Campbell v. Hussey154 to
find the Georgia Tobacco Identification Act preempted by the Federal
144. Id. at 444-46.
145. Id. at 443 (citing Savage v. Jones, 225 U.S. 501, 533 (1911)).
146. Id.
147. 331 U.S. 218 (1947).
148. Id. at 223-24.
149. Id. at 234-36.
150. Id. at 230. Atlantic Richfield contended that federal regulation of vessel design,
equipment, and operation would not disrupt an area of traditional state authority. In so arguing,
they pointed to a long history of exclusive federal regulation of vessel design and equipment
and a great deal of federal legislation regarding the control of vessel operation. Brief of
Appellees at 40-42. See generally Note, Federal Regulation of Aircraft Noise Under Federal
Aviation Act Precludes Local Police Power Noise Restrictions-City of Burbank v. Lockheed
Air Terminal, Inc., 15 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REv. 848 (1974).
151. 331 U.S. at 230.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. 368 U.S. 297 (1961).
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Tobacco Inspection Act. 155 The Georgia law required that certain types of
tobacco be marked with an identifying tag when received in warehouses for
sale. 156 The Court rejected the argument that the Georgia act was permissi-
ble because it "merely supplement[ed] the federal regulation" 157 and went
on to hold that "Congress, in legislating concerning the types of tobacco
sold at auction, preempted the field and left no room for any supplementary
state regulation."
158
Campbell was distinguished in Florida Lime & Avocado Growers,
Inc. v. Paul,159 which involved a California statute prohibiting transporta-
tion or sale in California of avocados that did not meet the state's minimum-
oil-content standard of maturity. 16 In a 5-4 decision, the Court upheld the
statute excluding avocados that did not meet the California standard despite
the fact that they had beerf certified as mature under federal regulations. 
161
Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, stated that federal regulation of a
field of commerce should not be deemed preemptive unless there are
persuasive reasons for preemption, either because the nature of the subject
matter permits no other conclusion or Congress had unmistakably so or-
dained. 162 The Florida Lime opinion concluded that "there is neither such
actual conflict between the two schemes of regulation that both cannot stand
in the same area, nor evidence of a congressional design to preempt the
field."
163
Again using the Rice standard, the Court in Pennsylvania v. Nelson'
64
held that the federal Smith Act, which prohibited the knowing advocacy of
the overthrow of the government of the United States by force or violence,
superseded the Pennsylvania Sedition Act, which proscribed the same activ-
ity. 165 The Court found that the pervasiveness of the congressional plan
made it reasonable to assume that no room was left for the states to
supplement it. 166 "Therefore, a state sedition statute is superseded regard-
less of whether it purports to supplement the federal law." 167 The Court also
found that the Pennsylvania statute touched a field in which the federal
interest was so dominant that the federal regulatory system must preclude
state law on the subject. 168 As the Court noted, "Congress having thus
155. Ird. at 302.
156. Id. at 298.
157. Ird. at 300.
158. rd. at 301.
159. 373 U.S. 132 (1963).
160. Id. at 133-34.
161. Id. at 152.
162. Ird. at 142.
163. Ird. at 141.
164. 350 U.S. 497 (1955).
165. Ird. at 509.
166. Id. at 504.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 504-05.
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treated seditious conduct as a matter of vital national concern, it is in no
sense a local enforcement problem." 169 Finally, the majority held that the
enforcement of a state sedition act would have created the danger of conflict
with the administration of the federal scheme.1
70
The dominant federal interest theme has also appeared in the area of
foreign affairs in several Supreme Court decisions on preemption. In Hines
v. Davidowitz, 171 the Court held that enforcement of Pennsylvania's Alien
Registration Act of 1939 was barred by the federal Alien Registration Act of
1940.172 The Court stated that its primary function in determining the
meaning and purpose of the act of Congress was to decide whether, under
the circumstances of the particular case, the state law "stands as an obstacle
to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of
Congress." 173 In determining that the Pennsylvania statute was an obstacle
to the execution of Congress' objectives, the Court found it important that
the legislation was in a field that affects foreign relations, the one area of
government that has, from the beginning, demanded broad national au-
thority. 1
74
The principle of exclusive federal control over the field of international
relations was reiterated in Zschernig v. Miller. 175 An Oregon statute dealing
with certain inheritance rights of nonresident aliens was found unconstitu-
tional by the Zschernig Court as "an intrusion by the State into the field of
foreign affairs which the Constitution entrusts to the President and the
Congress." 176 Justice Douglas' majority opinion went on to hold that, even
in the absence of a treaty, a state law may have a direct impact upon foreign
relations, adversely affecting the power of the federal government to deal
with the problems of international affairs and therefore must be held in-
valid. 177 Thus, in cases of pervasive Congressional legislation or areas of
special federal concern, such as national security and foreign affairs, the
Court generally finds that concurrent state legislation has been preempted by
the federal scheme.
It could be inferred from the Supreme Court decision in De Canas v.
Bica178 that a clear and unequivocal statement of exclusive federal authority
is required for a finding of preemption. The Court in De Canas held that a
169. Id. at 505.
170. Id.
171. 312 U.S. 52 (1941).
172. Id. at 74.
173. Id. at 67.
174. Id. at 67-68.
175. 389 U.S. 429 (1968).
176. Id. at 432.
177. Id. at 441.
178. 424 U.S. 351 (1976).
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California statute prohibiting employers from knowingly employing illegal
aliens was not preempted by either the United States Constitution or the
federal immigration law. 179 Justice Brennan used the standard he had set out
in Florida Lime as the basis for finding that a "clear and manifest purpose
of Congress" to preempt state regulation had not been shown. 180 However,
in two recent decisions, the Supreme Court has found preemption of state
laws in the absence of explicit declarations of preemptive intent.
In Jones v. Rath Packing Co.,181 the Court found that California weight
labeling requirements on certain processed foods were preempted by federal
law. 182 The California law required that the average net weight of food
packages be no less than the net weight stated on the packages. 183 The only
permissible variations were those caused by unavoidable deviations in the
manufacturing process. 18 4 By contrast, the applicable federal statute per-
mitted variations from the stated weight caused by unavoidable losses due to
the distribution as well as the manufacturing process. 185 Therefore, pack-
ages complying with the federal act could nonetheless be found in violation
of California's regulations. The Court stated that although the state law was
not inconsistent with the federal regulations, it was required to determine
whether the state law "stands as an obstacle to the purposes and objectives
of Congress." 18 6 The Court found preemption even though it was possible
to comply with both statutes. The Jones opinion stressed that in determining
whether the state law is an obstacle to Congress' objectives, the Court must
look to the relationship between state and federal laws as they are interpreted
and applied, not only as they were written. 187 In another recent case,
Douglas v. Seacoast Products, Inc. ,188 the Court held that two Virginia
statutes limiting the right of nonresidents and aliens to catch fish in the
state's waters were preempted by the federal Enrollment and Licensing
Act. 18 9 The Court noted that in this case, as in Jones, it was dealing with
federal legislation that arguably superseded state regulation in a field tradi-
tionally occupied by the states and that preemption therefore could be found
only if " 'that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.' -19 Justice
179. Id. at 365.
180. Id. at 357-58.
181. 430 U.S. 519 (1977).
182. Id. at 524.
183. Id. at 522-23 n.3.
184. Id. at 531.
185. Id. at 533.
186. Id. at 526 (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).
187. Id. at 526.
188. 431 U.S. 265 (1977).
189. Id. at 286-87.
190. Id. at 272 (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)).
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Marshall, writing for the majority, found nonetheless that " 'no state may
completely exclude federally licensed commerce' "191 and that any state law
that purports to do so must fail under the supremacy clause. 192 Relying on
Gibbons, the Court stressed that the federal license emphatically implied an
authority to licensed vessels to carry on the activity for which they are
licensed. 193 Interference with the operation of federal regulatory agencies
has been another basis for finding that state regulation stands as an obstacle
to the purposes and objectives of Congress. In City of Burbank v. Lockheed
Air Terminal, Inc., 194 the owner of the Burbank Airport sought an injunc-
tion against enforcement of a local ordinance 195 placing a curfew on all jet
flights from the airport between 11 p.m. and 7 a.m. 96 The district court
found the ordinance unconstitutional on both commerce clause and preemp-
tion grounds197 and the court of appeals affirmed on the basis of preemp-
tion. 198 Using the Rice standard, 199 the Supreme Court held that, given the
pervasive nature of the scheme of federal regulation of aircraft noise, the
FAA has exclusive jurisdiction in the regulation of aircraft noise.200 The
Court made this finding after an exhaustive examination of congressional
intent in passage of the Noise Control Act of 1972,201 which amended the
Federal Aviation Act of 1958,202 including a detailed look at the language of
the act, Senate and House reports, Senate and House hearings, and floor
debates. 20 3 As the opinion stated, "[t]he 1972 Act, by amending § 611 of
the Federal Aviation Act, also involves the Environmental Protection Agen-
cy (EPA) in the comprehensive scheme of federal control of the aircraft
noise problem."204 Further evidence of an intent that federal agencies fully
regulate the field of airspace management was found in the fact that
Congress did not leave the FAA to act at large, but rather provided compre-
hensive standards for it to follow. 20 5 These standards require that the FAA,
in establishing regulations, consider relevant data on aircraft noise, consult
191. Id. at 283 (quoting Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142
(1963)).
192. Id.
193. Id. at 285-86.
194. 411 U.S. 624 (1973).
195. Id. at 625-26 & n.1 (citing BURBANK, CAL., MUN. CODE §§ 20-32.1 (1970)).
196. Id. at 625.
197. 318 F. Supp. 914, 921-30 (C.D. Cal. 1970).
198. 457 F.2d 667, 670-76 (9th Cir. 1972).
199. See notes 151-153 and accompanying text supra.
200. 411 U.S. at 633.
201. 42 U.S.C. § 4906 (Supp. V 1975); 14 C.F.R. §§ 71, 73, 75, 77, 91, 93, 95, 99 (1977).
202. 49 U.S.C. §§ 1301-55, 1505 (1970).
203. 411 U.S. at 626-38.
204. Id. at 628-29 (footnote omitted).
205. Id. at 632.
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with federal, state, and local agencies, consider whether the regulations
provide for safety in air commerce, determine whether the regulations are
economically reasonable and technologically practicable, and evaluate the
extent to which the regulations carry out the purposes of the Act.206 Justice
Douglas, speaking for the majority, concluded by stating that the Court was
"not at liberty to diffuse the powers given by Congress to FAA and EPA by
letting the States or municipalities in on the planning. If that charge is to be
made, Congress alone must do it. "207
The exclusive power of a federal regulatory agency was also recog-
nized in Northern States Power Co. v. Minnesota.2"8 In Northern States,
the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals held that standards for radioactive
emissions were under the exclusive jurisidiction of the Atomic Energy
Commission, thus precluding the state from setting additional standards.
2°9
The court found that the broad scope of the authority conferred on the
Commission to set standards and prescribe rules and regulations was conclu-
sive evidence of a legislative intent to occupy the field.
210
One of the earliest preemption cases dealt with a fact situation similar
to that found in the Ray case. In Kelly v. Washington,211 a tug boat owner
challenged the validity of a Washington law calling for the inspection and
regulation of all motor-driven vessels not subject to inspection under the
laws of the United States.212 The challenge was based on the 1910 federal
Motor Boat Act, which contained no provision for the inspection of motor-
driven tugs.213 The Court noted that the federal act was passed during the
transition from steam powered vessels to vessels utilizing internal combus-
tion engines. 214 The Court held that Congress had carefully considered the
scope of existing laws and then decided to widen its area of regulation to
include only a specified class of motor-driven vessels. 215 Since no provision
of the federal act covered the same subject matter as the challenged state
law, there was no direct conflict between federal and state laws. The Court
found further that there was no need for national uniformity and thus the
state's right to require inspection of motor-driven tugs was upheld. 216 The
Court nonetheless suggested that if the state went further and attempted to
206. Id.
207. Id. at 640.
208. 447 F.2d 1143 (8th Cir. 1971), aff'd mem., 405 U.S. 1035 (1972).
209. 447 F.2d at 1154.
210. Id. at 1152-53.
211. Kelly v. Washington ex rel. Foss Co., 302 U.S. 1 (1937).
212. Id. at 3-4.
213. Id. at 8.
214. Id. at 5-7.
215. Id. at 7.
216. Id. at 15.
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impose structure, design, equipment, and operation standards beyond what
was essential to safety, such regulations would be invalid because of the
need for national uniformity. 217 The opinion stated,
Congress may establish standards and designs for the structure
and equipment of vessels, and may prescribe rules for their opera-
tion, which could not properly be left to the diverse action of the
States. The State of Washington might prescribe standards, de-
signs, equipment and rules of one sort, Oregon another, California
another, and so on ....
If. . . the State. . . attempts to impose particular standards
as to structure, design, equipment and operation which in the
judgment of the authorities may be desirable but pass beyond
what is plainly essential to safety and seaworthiness, the State will
encounter the principle that such requirements, if imposed at all,
must be through the action of Congress which can establish a
uniform rule.
218
Thus, the Court will find preemption where there is a direct conflict
between state and federal law or where Congress prohibits state action by
explicitly or implicitly expressing an intent to exclude supplementary state
legislation. 219 In the absence of direct conflict, the Court will look for a
showing of exclusionary intent on the part of Congress2 ' in order to find
preemption. In a succession of cases, the Court has utilized several factors
from which inferences of Congressional intent may be drawn. In areas of
traditional state control, state action may not be superseded by federal law.
However, the existence of a comprehensive federal scheme, the presence of
a dominant federal interest or the vesting of broad authority in a regulatory
agency may lead the Court to infer that Congress intended the federal
regulation to be exclusive. The possibility of inconsistent state regulation,
the frustration or interference with Congressional objectives and the need for
national uniformity of regulation are additional factors indicative of
congressional intent to preempt.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 14-15.
219. Incompatibility with the exclusionary intent of Congress is construed as a conflict
under the preemption doctrine. Thus, whether the intent to prohibit state action is expressed or
implied, the very existence of a state law that Congress intended to exclude may be held to be in
conflict with federal law. As a result, even where the provisions of a state law are otherwise
compatible with federal regulations, such a state law is considered as contrary to federal law as
if actual conflict existed in their terms. See, e.g., Teamsters Union, Local 20 v. Morton, 377
U.S. 252, 259-60 (1964); Garner v. Teamsters Union Local 776, 346 U.S. 485, 500 (1953).
220. The concept of Congressional intent is a complex and often elusive determination.
While an examination of the statutory language and legislative history pro% ides a useful starting
point, it affords little doctrinal consistency. This has led the courts to the conclusion that
preemption questions are resolved only on a case-by-case basis. See City of Burbank v.
Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624, 638 (1973); California v. Zook, 336 U.S. 725,731
(1949).
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C. Analysis of the Preemption Issue
An examination of the PWSA and its proposed amendments and the
Washington Tanker Law reveals no direct conflict in their respective provi-
sions. Oil tankers could comply with both federal and Washington state
regulations. Thus, the type of conflict the Supreme Court faced in Perez v.
Campbell,22 1 in which the provisions of the state law directly contradicted a
federal statute, is avoided in the present case. In deciding the preemption
issue in Ray, the Court must therefore ascertain congressional intent in
enacting the PWSA and in proposing the pending amendments by looking for
one or more of those factors described above as indicative of congressional
intent 2 2 Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp .223 laid the early groundwork for
the Court in the area of preemption by setting out several factors that
indicate a congressional intent to occupy the field. Justice Douglas, writing
for the majority in Rice, found that a preemptive intent may be shown by
pervasiveness of the federal scheme of regulation, dominant federal interest
in the field, and a state policy that may produce results inconsistent with the
objectives of the federal scheme.
224
1. The State Interest
The Court in Rice held that in areas in which the states have traditional
police powers, state action is not prohibited unless that is the "clear and
manifest purpose of Congress."225 That standard was reiterated in Florida
Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul,22 6 in which the Court went on to
state that federal legislation should not be deemed preemptive unless
Congress has "unmistakably . . . ordained" 227 that federal regulation is to
be exclusive. Therefore, it may be argued that only a direct conflict or
express declaration by Congress justifies a finding that state regulation of
traditional state interests must yield to federal legislation.
22 8
The State of Washington has extensive economic and ecological inter-
ests to protect in a very unique environment which, because of its geograph-
ical characteristics, has the potential for extensive oil spill damage. Wash-
ington has expressed concern for the potential impact of oil spills on the
important natural resources of the state and on jobs and income dependent
on those resources. 2 9 Puget Sound is a unique estuary in which the federal
221. 402 U.S. 637 (1971).
222. See generally Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM. L.
REV. 527 (1947); Radin, A Short Way With Statutes, 56 HARV. L. REv. 388 (1942).
223. 331 U.S. 218 (1947).
224. Id. at 230.
225. Id.
226. 373 U.S. 132 (1963).
227. Id. at 142.
228. See, e.g., De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351 (1976).
229. WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 88.16.170 (Supp. 1976).
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government maintains thirteen wildlife preserves and the state operates
numerous fish hatcheries and two oyster preserves. 230 As the appellants in
the Ray case pointed out,'"Washington and its citizens have a substantial
economic interest in the natural resources of Puget Sound. The value of the
beds, tidelands and waterfront lands adjacent to Puget Sound are estimated
to exceed $2,000,000,000 . . The Puget Sound fisheries industry,
including commercial and sport fishing, packing and canning, contributes
$170,000,000 annually to Washington's economy." 231 The Washington
Tanker Law recognizes that Puget Sound is a confined environment with
irregular shorelines and limited space for maneuvering, which increase the
likelihood of long-term damage from oil spills. 232 Washington may claim
that regulations such as tug escorts and access limits are the types of
regulations that must be designed to meet diverse local conditions such as
channel depths, width, tides and weather.
In this vein, the State of Washington has argued that the Tanker Law
should be upheld on the basis of a congressional policy of federal-state
cooperation in environmental planning. 233 The state urged that Congress had
anticipated at least some state participation in virtually all of its water-
related regulatory programs. 234 But the district court pointed out that in
those statutes, 235 Congress had explicitly invited state participation in the
formation of the regulatory scheme. 236 The district court in Ray found that
the PWSA does not invite state participation and therefore concluded that
Congress did not intend to share regulatory authority over tankers with the
states.
237
The district court in Ray went on to examine and distinguish two cases
cited by Washington to support its position, Askew v. American Waterways
Operators, Inc.,238 and Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit.239
Askew held that a Florida statute imposing strict liability for any oil-spill
damage to the state or to private persons did not conflict with federal
230. Morris, Constitutional Preemption of State Laws Against Massive Oil Spills, I U.
PUGET SOUND L. REV. 73, 74 (1977).
231. Brief for Appellants at 12.
232. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 88.16.170 (Supp. 1976).
233. Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Evans, No. C 75-648 M, slip op. at 4 (W.D. Wash., Sept. 24,
1976), prob. juris. noted sub nom. Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 430 U.S. 905 (1977) (No. 76-
930, 1977 Term).
234. Id.
235. Estuarine Act of 1968, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1221-26 (1976); Federal Water Pollution Control
Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1151-75 (1970) (current version at id. §§ 1251-1376 (Supp. V 1975)); Deepwa-
ter Ports Act of 1974, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1501-24 (Supp. V 1975); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1857 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
236. Slip op. at 5. See generally Tripp, Tensions and Conflicts in Federal Pollution Control
and Water Resource Policy, 14 HARV. J. LEGIs. 225 (1977).
237. Slip op. at 5.
238. 411 U.S. 325 (1973).
239. 362 U.S. 440 (1960).
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regulation of oil tankers. 24 The court in Ray distinguished Askew on the
ground that the federal act in question reflected a congressional policy of
federal-state cooperation. 241 In the Huron case, the Court upheld Detroit's
smoke abatement ordinance based on a finding that there was no overlap
between the scope of the federal inspection statute and that of the Detroit
ordinance.242 The environmental aims of the Detroit ordinance were conse-
quently not preempted by the federal inspection statutes, which were
designed to insure the safety of vessels subject to inspection. 243 In contrast,
the district court in Ray noted that "[s]ince the PWSA introduced environ-
mental considerations into the federal tanker requlations, the state of Wash-
ington cannot say that there is 'no overlap' between the state and federal
laws." 2I
However, Congressional awareness of the fact that each port contains
unique environmental conditions and hazards is evidenced by the fact that
the PWSA requires the Coast Guard to balance a number of such factors in
prescribing regulations for individual ports.245 Provisions in both the PWSA
and proposed amendments require the balancing of such factors as port and
waterway configurations, differences in geographic, climatic, and other
conditions and circumstances, environmental factors, and local practices
and customs.
246
2. Pervasiveness of the Federal Scheme
The primary purpose of the PWSA and proposed amendments is "to
authorize a comprehensive inspection and enforcement program for in-
creased navigation and vessel safety and enhanced protection of the marine
environment.' '247 Where a federal statute deals with a subject extensively
and in detail, the Court often infers that Congress intended to exclude
supplementary state action. The federal scheme is said to be so comprehen-
sive or pervasive that in effect, Congress has "left no room" for additional
state regulation. 248 The comprehensiveness of the federal scheme, however,
is not indicative of exclusionary congressional intent in every situation.
249
The PWSA provisions give the Coast Guard broad authority to estab-
lish vessel traffic control systems for ports and harbors in order to "protect
240. 411 U.S. at 344. See generally Note, Liability for Maritime Oil Pollution: A Compari-
son of the Maine Coastal Conveyance Act With Federal Liability Provisions, 29 ME. L. REv. 47
(1977).
241. Slip op. at 5.
242. 362 U.S. at 446.
243. Id.
244. Slip op. at 5.
245. See note 102 and accompanying text supra.
246. Id.
247. Proposed Amendments § 102(b), supra note 15, at S8748.
248. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
249. See, e.g., New York State Dep't of Social Servs. v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405,415 (1973).
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the navigable waters and the resources therein from environmental harm
resulting from vessel or structure damage ... ."250 The Washington
Tanker Law seeks to "decrease the likelihood of oil spills on Puget Sound
and its shorelines .... "251 Thus, an argument could be made for uphold-
ing the Tanker Law on the basis that it complements the PWSA. The Court
has frequently upheld state laws that further the goals of or are complemen-
tary to the federal act in question. 252 Since the Cooley decision in 1851,
however, the Court has also recognized that some subjects require a compre-
hensive federal scheme of regulation without the benefit of state supple-
ments. For example, the Court in Campbell v. Hussev253 rejected the
argument that the state statute was permissible because it merely supple-
mented federal regulations. The Court found that Congress, in prescribing
the types of tobacco that could be sold at auction, had left no room for any
supplementary state action.354
On the other hand, the Court in Florida Lime upheld a state statute
regulating the maturity of avocados despite federal legislation in the field. 255
Justice Brennan stated, however, that the maturity of avocados seemed to be
an inherently unlikely candidate for exclusive federal regulation.256 By
contrast, the subject matter of the Ray case, regulation of the design,
contruction, and operation of oil tankers, is a far more likely subject for
federal concern. Therefore, the Court in Ray may infer a congressional
intent to occupy the field of tanker regulation from the pervasiveness of the
federal scheme in an area of nationwide significance. If such an inference is
made, supplementary state action such as the Tanker Law will be pro-
hibited.
3. Dominant Federal Interest
The regulation of oil tankers is arguably a dominant federal interest,
especially in light of the current national interest in the energy supply and
dramatic rise in the amount of oil being transported by sea.257 The regulation
of oil tankers is also becoming a matter of increasing international impor-
tance to the United States.258 Federal control over foreign affairs is exclusive
and is not subject to interference by state laws that might frustrate foreign
policy or create difficulties with foreign governments for which the nation as
a whole would be held to answer35 9 Therefore, the Court has long recog-
250. 33 U.S.C. § 1221 (Supp. V 1975).
251. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 88.16.170 (Supp. 1976).
252. See, e.g., Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1974); Florida Lime &
Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132 (1963).
253. 368 U.S. 297 (1961).
254. Id. at 301.
255. Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 135 (1963).
256. Id. at 143.
257. 1977 SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 8-9.
258. Id.
259. See, e.g., United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942); United States v. Belmont, 301
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nized foreign relations as an area of dominant federal interest demanding
broad national authority. 260 The fact that the state legislation affected
foreign relations was important to the Court in Hines v. Davidowitz,261 in
which case the Court found that the state legislation stood as an obstacle to
the objectives of Congress. 262 And in Zschernig v. Miller, 263 an intrusion by
state action into the area of international affairs was also held unconstitu-
tional.
264
The PWSA and proposed amendments strongly encourage the estab-
lishment of international standards for the regulation of tanker design,
equipment, and operation.2 65 The proposed amendments direct the Secretary
of the Department in which the Coast Guard operates to undertake interna-
tional negotiations to achieve acceptance of regulations promulgated under
the PWSA as international standards. 266 Evidence of the importance Which
Congress places on the achievement of international standards is fourd in
the policy statement of the proposed amendments267 as well as in the Senate
Report pursuant to passage of the Act. The Senate Report states that:
[International solutions in this area are preferable since the prob-
lem of marine pollution is worldwide. . . . The Committee fully
concurs that multilateral action with respect to comprehensive
standards for the design, construction, maintenance and operation
of tankers for the protection of the marine environment would be
far preferable to unilateral imposition of standards.
26
The Coast Guard, in carrying out its task of achieving international stan-
dards of regulation, has submitted a set of regulatory proposals to the Inter-
Governmental Maritime Consultative Organization (IMCO), the maritime
division of the United Nations, for consideration at a major international
conference called by President Carter for February, 1978.269
Thus, the establishment of a worldwide scheme of regulations is a goal
being actively sought by the President, Congress, and the Coast Guard.
Enforcement of state legislation in the field may seriously impair the
achievement of that goal. If the Ray Court finds that the state action at issue
U.S. 324 (1937); United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
260. See, e.g., Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941); United States v. Curtiss-Wright
Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
261. 312 U.S. 52 (1941).
262. Id. at 67-68.
263. 389 U.S. 429 (1968).
264. Id. at 432.
265. Proposed Amendments § 303, supra, note 15, at S8752.
266. Id.
267. Id. § 102(c), at S8749. "It is further declared to be the policy of the Congress in this
Act. . . to support and encourage continued active United States efforts to obtain internation-
al agreements concerning navigation and vessel safety and protection of the marine environ-
ment." Id.
268. 1972 SENATE REPORT, supra note 87, at 23.
269. 123 CONG. REC. S8602 (daily ed. May 25, 1977).
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is an obstacle to Congressional objectives in this area of dominant federal
interest, such action will be held invalid.
4. The Regulatory Agency
The fact that Congress has granted the authority to administer a
comprehensive federal program to the Coast Guard may be another ground
for inferring a preemptive intent.270 City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air
Terminal, Inc.2 71 established that where Congress has enacted a pervasive
scheme of federal regulation involving a regulatory agency with broad
discretionary power to prescribe and enforce regulations, state action in the
area is forbidden, even though its effect on the federal program may be
slight.2 72 Given the pervasive nature of the federal scheme of regulation of
aircraft noise, the Court in Burbank held that the Federal Aviation Adminis-
tration (FAA) had exclusive jurisdiction, thus preempting state action in the
field.273 In reaching its decision, the Court found evidence of congressional
intent to occupy the field in the broad grant of discretionary power to the
FAA.274 Under the Noise Control Act of 1972,275 the FAA, in exercising its
authority, is required to balance a number of factors. 276 The Court in
Burbank held that the Act required a delicate balancing of these factors and
went on to state that "[t]he interdependence of these factors requires a
uniform and exclusive system of federal regulation if the congressional
objectives underlying the . . . .Act are to be fulfilled."
277
In another regulatory agency case, Northern States Power Co. v.
Minnesota,278 congressional authority was given to the Atomic Energy
Commission (AEC). The eighth circuit held that standards for radioactive
emissions were exclusively under the jurisdiction of the AEC, thus preclud-
ing the state from setting additional standards. 279 The court found that the
broad scope of the authority conferred on the Commission to set standards
and prescribe rules and regulations was conclusive evidence of legislative
intent to occupy the field. 280
270. See, e.g., San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 243-44 (1959).
271. 411 U.S. 624 (1973).
272. This concept was not new to the Court. In reaching the conclusion that state safety
equipment requirements for railroad trains were superseded by the Federal Boiler Inspection
Act of 1911, the Court in Napier v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 272 U.S. 602 (1926), took into
account the fact that the duty of the Interstate Commerce Commissionwas not merely to
inspect, but also to prescribe rules and regulations. Id. at 612. The broad scope of authority
granted to the ICC was found to be conclusive evidence of a legislative intent to occupy the
field and therefore preclude state regulation. Id. at 613.
273. 411 U.S. at 633.
274. Id. at 626-27.
275. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4901-18 (Supp. V 1975).
276. 411 U.S. at 632.
277. Id. at 638-39.
278. 447 F.2d 1143 (8th Cir. 1971), aff'd mem., 405 U.S. 1035 (1972).
279. Id. at 1154.
280. Id. at 1152-53.
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In the Ray case, Congress has given the Coast Guard broad authority to
carry out the provisions of the PWSA. For example, the PWSA and
proposed amendments grant the Coast Guard broad discretionary power to
establish size limitations, pilotage and tug escort requirements. 281 The Coast
Guard also may prescribe and enforce vessel traffic systems and enter into
negotiations for the purpose of achieving international standards of tanker
regulation. 282 By contrast, the State of Washington prohibits entry of vessels
of a certain size, and requires pilots and tug escorts in certain cases.
283
The potential contrary application of state and federal laws is therefore
an important consideration in Ray. The enactment by the State of Washing-
ton of additional and often more stringent regulations would appear to
impair the discretionary power given to the Coast Guard to determine what
standards should be imposed. This exercise of independent state discretion
and resulting impairment of federal discretion may itself raise an inference
that Congress intended to occupy the field and therefore preclude state
regulation.28 4
5. Inconsistent State Regulation
The possibility of inconsistent state regulation may lead the Court to
find that the state statute interferes with Congressional intent. The Court has
consistently struck down state legislation that acts as an obstacle to congres-
sional purposes. 285 In Jones v. Rath Packing Co.,286 the Court noted that in
determining whether a state law is an obstacle to the objectives of Congress,
it must look to the relationship between state and federal laws not only as
they are written but also as they are interpreted and applied.
287
The Washington Tanker Law completely prohibits all vessels over
125,000 DWT from entering Puget Sound. 288 The PWSA gives the Coast
Guard discretion in establishing size limitations.289 The Tanker Law re-
quires Washington state licensed pilots on all vessels over 50,000 DWT.290
A tug escort is required by the Washington statute for all vessels of a certain
size that do not meet stringent design criteria.291 Again, Congress has given
281. See notes 93-97 and accompanying text supra.
282. See note 93 and accompanying text supra.
283. See notes 118-120 and accompanying text supra.
284. See, e.g., City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624 (1973); Motor
Coach Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274 (1971); Bethlehem Steel Co. v. New York State
Labor Relations Bd., 330 U.S. 767 (1947); Cloverleaf Butter Co. v. Patterson, 315 U.S. 148
(1942).
285. See Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
286. 430 U.S. 519 (1977).
287. Id. at 526.
288. WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 88.16.190 (Supp. 1976).
289. 33 U.S.C. § 1221 (Supp. V 1975).
290. WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 88.16.180 (Supp. 1976).
291. Id. § 88.16.190.
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the Coast Guard the authority to exercise its judgment as to the circum-
stances that would warrant requirement of a tug escort. 292 The design
requirements of the Tanker Law and the PWSA with the proposed amend-
ments are very similar. There is a great deal of overlap in the standards, with
basic safety requirements such as double bottoms and collision avoidance
radar included in both.293 Examination of Coast Guard action under authori-
ty of the PWSA is therefore necessary to determine whether the state statute
would interfere with the effectuation of Congressional goals.
The Coast Guard has created a mandatory vessel traffic control system
(VTS) in Puget Sound294 as authorized by the PWSA. The VTS establishes a
network of one-way traffic lanes throughout Puget Sound, each 1000 yards
wide and separated by zones 500 yards wide.295 The Coast Guard has
established a single traffic lane in Rosario Strait and has prohibited the
passage of more than one tanker over 70,000 DWT in either direction at any
given time, a size limitation which is reduced to 40,000 DWT in adverse
weather. 296 The VTS also requires use of radio-telephone equipment to
maintain continuous vessel contact with the Coast Guard's Vessel Traffic
Center in Seattle, and requires regular reporting of the vessel's position,
speed and other pertinent data.297 The Coast Guard's Puget Sound Captain
of the Port has exercised authority granted in the PWSA by imposing tug
escort requirements in Rosario Strait.298 In addition, Coast Guard adoption
of generally applicable standards of tug assistance for tankers operating in
confined waters is under consideration. 299 Regulations establishing tanker
design standards under the PWSA are based largely on the provisions of the
International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, adopt-
ed in 1973 by the Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative Organization
(IMCO), the maritime division of the United Nations. 3°° In short, the Coast
Guard has made considerable use of the authority granted to it by the
PWSA. In constructing and enforcing VTS and supplementary regulations
tailored to meet the unique needs and conditions of Puget Sound as well as
numerous other ports throughout the country, 30' the Coast Guard is carrying
292. 33 U.S.C. § 1221 (Supp. V 1975).
293. See notes 11 & 119 and accompanying text supra.





298. Brief for Appellees at 34-35.
299. 41 Fed. Reg. 18,770 (1976); 42 Fed. Reg. 5,956, 5,958 (1977).
300. 40 Fed. Reg. 48,280 (1975); 41 Fed. Reg. 1,479 (1976); 41 Fed. Reg. 54,177 (1976).
301. Vessel Traffic Systems have also been established in San Francisco, Houston/Galves-
ton, Louisville and portions of the Gulf Intercoastal Waterways, and are under development in
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out the purposes Congress set forth in the PWSA302 and proposed amend-
ments.
303
Hearings before the House and Senate Committees at the time of
passage of the PWSA demonstrated recognition of the detrimental effect that
varying state regulations would have on the Coast Guard's ability to carry
out its responsibilities. 304 During hearings on the bill in 1970, one represen-
tative expressed concern that "each of the coastal States [might impose]
different types of regulations and requirements so that an incoming vessel
would be in a state of confusion. '" 30 5 During the 1971 hearings, the Chairman
of the National Transportation Safety Board urged adoption of a comprehen-
sive program of federal regulation of vessels because state regulation "could
result in a patchwork quilt approach which would lack standard frequencies
and equipment and would place a greater burden upon ships than a federally-
regulated program.' '3 6 Inconsistent state legislation in the area of tanker
regulation would therefore impair the broad discretionary power granted to
the Coast Guard to establish international as well as national standards for
the design and operation of tankers. This interference with the federal
scheme set out in the PWSA may be seen by the Ray Court as an obstacle to
the Congressional goal of establishing a comprehensive program of tanker
regulation.
6. Need for Uniformity
The comprehensive scheme for oil tanker regulation set out in the
PWSA also suggests that Congress intended to provide uniform standards
governing ships operating in United States coastal waters. The district court
found that the purpose of Title II of the PWSA was to provide such uniform
regulations and went on to state that "Balkanization of regulatory authority
over this most interstate, even international, of transportation systems is
foreclosed by the national policy embodied in the PWSA. "37 In so ruling,
New York and New Orleans. See Hearings on Vessel Traffic Control before the Subcomm. on
Coast Guard and Navigation of the House Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess., Ser. No. 94-39 (1976).
302. 33 U.S.C. § 1221 (Supp. V 1975).
303. Proposed Amendments § 102(b), supra note 15, at S8748.
304. Hearings on Port and Harbor Safety Before the Subcomm. on Coast Guard, Coast and
Geodetic Survey, and Navigation of the House Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 91st
Cong., 2d Sess., Ser. No. 91-34 (1970).
305. Id. at 27-28.
306. Hearings on Port and Harbor Safety Before the Subcomm. on Coast Guard, Coast and
Geodetic Survey, and Navigation of the House Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 92d
Cong., 1st Sess., Ser. No. 92-12 (1971).
307. Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Evans, No. C 75-648 M, slip op. at 3 (W.D. Wash., Sept. 24,
1976), prob. juris. noted sub nom. Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 430 U.S. 905 (1977) (No. 76-
930, 1977 Term).
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the district court followed a long line of decisions which recognized that
some subjects demand uniform, exclusive regulation by the federal govern-
ment to avoid the adverse cumulative effects of inconsistent local regula-
tions. 30 8 For example, Northern States Power Co. v. Minnesota3°9 dealt
with state efforts to set standards for radioactive emissions. 310 In holding
that the nature of the subject matter supported preemption, the court focused
on the potential problems involved in allowing the states to establish their
own regulations for matters of such nationwide concern.
311
This fear of the cumulative effects of inconsistent state regulations was
also voiced by Justice Douglas writing for the majority in Burbank. In
confirming the exclusive power of the FAA to regulate noise pollution,
Douglas stated that "[i]f we were to uphold the Burbank ordinance and a
significant number of municipalities followed suit, it is obvious that frac-
tionalized control of the timing of take-offs and landings would severely
limit the flexibility of the FAA in controlling air traffic flow.'"312
The threat of inconsistent state regulations, the major concern of the
Court in Burbank, has already materialized in the area of tanker regulation.
The State of Alaska has enacted tanker design and operation legislation
inconsistent with the Washington Tanker Law. The Alaska statute313 re-
quires payment of a "risk charge" and use of a tug escort unless tankers
meet design requirements different from those of Washington. 314 In addi-
tion, the risk charge scheme encourages the use of large tankers and
penalizes the use of small tankers. 315 Alaska's approach of attempting to
reduce the number of accidents by reducing the number of tankers navigat-
ing its waters may rely on the same logic that prompted both Congress and
the Coast Guard to reject setting across-the-board size limitations in their
comprehensive program of regulation. In any event, the enactment of the
Alaska statute establishes the fact, and not just the possibility, of inconsis-
308. See, e.g., City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624 (1973);
Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945); Kelly v. Washington ex rel. Foss Co., 302
U.S. 1 (1937).
309. 447 F.2d 1143 (8th Cir. 1971), aff'd mem., 405 U.S. 1035 (1972).
310. Id. at 1145.
311. Id. at 1153-54. See generally Note, New Opportunities for State Participation in the
Control of Radioactive Pollution, 52 CHI.-KErN L. REV. 157 (1975); Note, Preemption Under
the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 11 TULSA L.J. 397 (1976); Federal Aiation Noise Control,
supra note 70.
312. City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624, 639 (1973).
313. ALASKA STAT. §§ 30.20.010-30.20.070 (1976).
314. Proposed regulations to implement the Alaska law indicate that calculation of risk
charges will be based on a "vessel pollution coefficient" assigned to each tanker. The vessel
pollution coefficient will be determined by the design features of the tanker. As a result, a
75,000 DWT tanker will be assessed twice the "risk charge" of a simikrly equipped 150,000




tent state regulations. Recognition of the potential detrimental effects of
inconsistency recently prompted the Court in Douglas to state that "[s]uch
proliferation . . . would create precisely the sort of Balkanization of inter-
state commercial activity which the Constitution was intended to pre-
vent. "316 The national interest in maintaining the movement of oil to supply
the country's energy needs while protecting the marine environment is
reflected in the passage of the PWSA. Application of inconsistent state
regulations in this area of multistate concern 317 would severely hinder the
realization of Congress' objectives. Where uniformity in tanker regulation is
vital to the national interest in energy supplies, a strong inference of
preemption will arise. In addition, the subject matter itself, tanker design
and regulation, appears to be one requiring national standards. In Kelly v.
Washington318 the Court found that there was no federal provision for the
inspection of motor-driven tugs and no need for national uniformity; thus
the state's right to require inspection of tugs was upheld.319 The Court
suggested, however, that if the state attempted to impose design, equipment
and operation standards, such regulations would be invalid because of the
need for national uniformity. 320 The PWSA establishes a comprehensive
regulatory program calling for the Coast Guard to use its discretion to
promulgate and enforce nationwide requirements and to achieve internation-
al standards for tanker regulation. In light of this federal legislation, the
State of Washington enacted its Tanker Law imposing standards for the
design, equipment and operation of tankers. Consequently, as the Court in
Kelly warned, the Tanker Law may be forced to yield to the discretionary
authority of the Coast Guard to achieve international uniformity of tanker
regulation.
Conclusion
The enactment of the PWSA reflects a strong federal interest in estab-
lishing comprehensive regulations of tanker design, equipment and opera-
tion for safety and the protection of the marine environment. In addition, a
congressional intent to exclude concurrent state legislation may be inferred
from several factors discussed above. For example, the pervasiveness of the
regulatory scheme implies that Congress intended to exclude even sup-
plementary state regulation in the area. Any obstacles that state legislation
would impose on Congress' objectives in an area of dominant federal
316. Douglas v. Seacoast Prods., Inc., 431 U.S. 265, 286 (1977).
317. See, e.g., Cloverleaf Butter Co. v. Patterson, 315 U.S. 148, 167 (1942). See generally
Okidi, Toward Regional Arrangements for Regulation of Marine Pollution, 4 OCEAN DEV. &
INT'L L. 1 (1977).
318. Kelly v. Washington ex rel. Foss Co., 302 U.S. 1 (1937).
319. Id. at 15.
320. Id.
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interest, the conduct of foreign affairs, also points to a finding of preemp-
tion. A strong inference of preemptive intent may also be found in the fact
that inconsistent state regulations would significantly interfere with the
broad discretionary power granted to the Coast Guard to establish interna-
tional standards of tanker regulation. Finally, the requirement of uniformity
in tanker regulation to supply the nation's energy needs demands exclusive
federal regulation of the field.
It is recognized that the State of Washington has a strong and valid
interest in the protection of Puget Sound from damage due to oil spills.
However, in light of the powerful federal interests involved and the fear of
the cumulative effects of inconsistent state regulations, uniform regulation
of tankers by the federal government through the PWSA should preempt
enforcement of the Washington law.
POSTSCRIPT
On March 6, 1978 the United States Supreme Court handed down its
decision in Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co. 321 In an opinion written by Justice
White and joined by Justices Stewart, Blackmun and Burger, the Court held
the pilotage requirement as applied to enrolled vessels, as well as the size
limitation and the design requirements of the Washington Tanker Law
invalid under the supremacy clause of the Constitution. The tug escort
provision of the Tanker law was upheld on the ground that the Coast Guard
had not prescribed a tug escort rule for Puget Sound or decided against such
a requirement. The Court stated, however, that regulations by the Coast
Guard may be forthcoming that would preempt the state's present tug escort
requirement.
Justice Marshall, joined by Justices Brennan and Rehnquist, concurred
in the majority's finding that the pilotage requirement was invalid with respect
to enrolled vessels and that the tug escort provision had not been preempted.
Justice Marshall did not, however, agree with the Court's conclusion that
the size limitation was invalid under the supremacy clause and saw no
reason to reach the issue of whether the design requirements of the Tanker
Law were preempted by the PWSA. Justice Stevens submitted a separate
opinion, joined by Justice Powell, in which he stated that he was persuaded
that the tug escort provision had been invalidated by the PWSA. Justice
Stevens concurred with the remainder of the majority's opinion.
321. 46 U.S.L.W. 4200 (U.S. Mar. 7, 1978).
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